Data Sharing and the Blue Badge Parking Scheme

Back in 2008 the government announced that they were going to reform some of the ways the disabled parking / blue-badge scheme worked to reduce the amount of fraudulent use. When I heard this discussed on the radio, the government’s spokesman talked about providing £10 million towards a data sharing scheme to enable a council parking attendant to check on the validity of a blue badge issued by another council.

I have a knee-jerk adverse reaction to the words “government” and “data sharing” – especially when they are used in the same context as “the prevention and detection of crime”, so I checked out the strategy document (PDF) on the Department for Transport’s (DfT) site and was pleasantly surprised to find a sensible proposal:

“The preferred option going forward is to create a system which allows sharing of data through the linking of existing local authority databases. DfT will provide local authorities with up to £10m in funding over the next three years to establish a system of data-sharing.”

That was back in October 2008, and now a consultant has finished a survey of all the IT systems local councils use to administer the scheme, the DfT is starting to run data sharing workshops with local councils, beginning to design the system (December status update – PDF).

In the meantime Rochdale council has made a successful bid to the Government Connect benefits realisation fund to investigate the “establishment of a national database with local access” for the blue badge scheme.

So, it will be interesting to see if a distributed approach is maintained and I’d like to offer my suggestions so that privacy is built in from the start. Because when you look at the problem, there is probably no need to share data.

Implement a simple question and answer approach. Not data sharing and not a centralised database.

Whose data is it?

People apply to their local council to issue a permit, so it is the job of the local council to look after that data. It’s the permit holder’s data that they entrust to the local council and in Data Protection Act terms, the local council is the Data Controller. The name of the issuing council is written on the permit along with a permit number (that also identifies the gender of the owner) and the date the permit expires.

Who needs to access it?

Parking enforcement officers from all over the UK (and perhaps eventually Europe) don’t need access to any more data than is written on the permint.

All they need is the answer to one question: “is this permit valid, invalid or being used illegally?”.

They don’t need to see any of the information that the issuing council has about the permit owner.

A parking officer may also like to report a concern to the issuing council – that they suspect the permit may be being used illegally. Sending this information to the council that issued the permit would then allow the council to get in touch with the permit holder directly. This keeps the relationship between the local council and the permit holder and doesn’t make the permit holder subject to potentially inconsistent actions of parking attendants anywhere in the country.

A network of local databases:

From a technical perspective, the system constraints are simply this:

  • Each council needs to keep the responsibility of looking after the data of their permit holders.
  • Other authorities (who are properly authorised and validated by the issuing council) need to be able to ask a question of this information, and receive an answer.

So here’s one way of building this system.

Each council maintains their own database of permits and permit holders (as the DfT initially suggests). They look after the security of the data and they don’t export the data to any other system.

Each council issues all of the other councils an electronic access key that allows them to ask a validity question from the issuing council’s database.

Whenever a parking enforcement officer needs to check whether a permit is valid, they send:

  • The permit ID in question
  • Their ID (e.g. their badge number – something that can individually identify them)
  • Their council’s access key

to the council that issued the permit (they can read this from the permit). The issuing council would then reply with one of four answers:

  1. We didn’t issue that permit. (It’s probably a forgery.)
  2. We issued that permit, and the permit is valid.
  3. The permit is invalid (it may have just expired — this allows the issuing council to set their own grey-area) so doesn’t confer any rights to disregard parking restrictions.
  4. The permit is invalid and has been reported stolen or withdrawn by the issuer and should be seized.

The parking attendant can then perform the relevant statutory actions.

No personal data needs to be shared between the issuing council and the parking attendant, wherever they are in the country.

Notes

  1. I’m not an expert on parking, permit fraud or enforcement. There may be many reasons why this simple query / answer approach wouldn’t solve the problems with fraudulent permit use. However, this is the best place to start. If people think that a parking enforcement officer needs more information then they should make the case for this. It is always best to share the minimum amount of data necessary to remain compliant with the third (only get and use data you need) data protection principle.
  2. I’ve simplified this discussion to the broad question of data copying, data sharing or my preferred question:response which would share the minimum of personal information. There’s a separate technical discussion about the best way of achieving this, and whether it would be best implemented using public-private key encryption, with a central-key management system operated jointly by all councils. There would be some other issues to explore around how long a key is valid for, and how a local council revokes another authority’s access.
  3. I’d also be tempted to consider whether using near-field RFID chips in the permits would add value to the system and make the permits harder to forge. It would also reduce the frequency of number keying errors by a glove-wearing parking attendant on a cold day, as their terminal would just be able to read the permit ID through the windscreen.

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